Economic corruption remains a structural challenge within Iran’s monetary and banking system. This research aims to analyze the central role of transparency and conflict-of-interest management as key strategies for preventing economic corruption, while also examining the extent to which executive regulations align with the foundations of these two principles as outlined in the overarching policies issued by the Supreme Leader. Using a descriptive-analytical method, the study scrutinizes the general policies of the system in the area of anti-corruption, along with executive regulations including the By-Law on Preventing the Accumulation of Non-Performing Loans (2018) and the Directive on Acquisition of Shares in Banks and Non-Banking Credit Institutions (2024). The central question is: How do the shortcomings of the Non-Performing Loans By-Law and the Share Acquisition Directive hinder the effective realization of transparency and conflict-of-interest management strategies in controlling economic corruption? The issued general policies clearly emphasize transparency, accountability, elimination of special privileges, and conflict-of-interest management as fundamental bases for controlling corruption. However, economic corruption emerges in the gap between these macro principles and detailed regulations. The analysis reveals that the Non-Performing Loans By-Law and the Share Acquisition Directive suffer from serious deficiencies which collectively render preventive measures ineffective. The ultimate solution involves a fundamental revision of executive regulations, focusing on clarifying transparent mechanisms, establishing independent and capable supervisory bodies, and precisely defining responsibilities and enforcement guarantees. This would bridge the gap between law and practice and break the cycle of corruption.