Despite their originally decentralized nature, crypto-asset markets have increasingly relied on centralized exchanges that play a critical role in market access, asset custody, and transaction execution, while simultaneously concentrating legal and economic risks. In Iran, after a prolonged period of regulatory absence, the regulation of crypto-asset exvhanges has largely been centralized within the Central Bank.

This study aims to assess the institutional efficiency of the regulatory authority governing crypto-asset exchanges in Iran from a law-and-economics perspective and in light of comparative regulatory models relevant to the topic. The research adopts a descriptive–analytical method, examining different institutional approaches to the regulation of crypto-asset exchanges and evaluating their economic and legal implications.

The findings indicate that although a central bank centric regulatory model offers advantages such as regulatory unity and reduced regulatory arbitrage, its precautionary orientation, conflicting mandates, and limited institutional compatibility with rapidly evolving crypto-asset markets hinder the simultaneous achievement of economic efficiency, competition, and innovation. This model may also increase transaction costs and encourage the migration of activities toward informal or offshore markets.

Accordingly, the study concludes that establishing an independent specialized regulatory authority, equipped with comprehensive jurisdiction, risk-based regulation, and flexible regulatory tools, provides a more effective framework for ensuring market stability, protecting users, and fostering sustainable innovation in Iran’s crypto-asset exchanges.