Suppression of Terrorist Acts through Economic Sanctions of the United Nations

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Assistant Professor of Law, Arak University,Iran.

2 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Faculty of Administrative and Economic Sciences, Arak University,Iran.

3 Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Payam Noor University, Tehran,Iran.

Abstract
Economic sanctions have become increasingly prominent policy instruments since the beginning of the 21st century. Major global players, such as United States of America, European Union, and the United Nations, mostly use punitive economic measures to prevent state violence and other state actions deemed intolerable. Sanctions have been a major tool in crises including major human rights violations, terrorism, military aggression, proliferation of nuclear weapons and commercial disputes. Emphasizing on economic means distinguishes struggling against terrorist acts from other measures. Therefore, the economic and military power of states in process of dealing with such actions and the use of various economic tools such as the implementation of economic sanctions make curbing terrorist acts and protecting international security possible. Therefore, along with other effective action and reaction strategies in confrontation with terrorism, the most important strategy is to adopt sanctions approaches or prescribe economic sanctions when facing terrorist acts. Thus, regarding effective struggle against terrorism, economic sanction not only does not lead to violation of human rights, but also it is considered as a strategy to restore lost human rights.

Keywords


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